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Abstract
Background: We reviewed the implementation of New Zealand laws in relation to the activities
of the tobacco industry and their allies. Material for two brief case studies was obtained from
correspondence with official agencies, official information requests, internet searches (tobacco
industry documents and official government sites), and interviews with 12 key informants.
Results: The first case study identified four occasions over a period of 14 years where New
Zealand Government agencies appeared to fail to enforce consumer protection law, although
apparent breaches by the tobacco industry and their allies had occurred in relation to statements
on the relative safety of secondhand smoke. The second case study examined responses to a legal
requirement for the tobacco industry to provide information on tobacco additives. There was
failure to enforce the law, and a failure of the political process for at least 13 years to clarify and
strengthen the law. Relevant factors in both these cases of 'policy slippage' appear to have been
financial and opportunity costs of taking legal action, political difficulties and the fragmented nature
of government structures.
Conclusion: Considered together, these case studies suggest the need for governments to: (i)
make better use of national consumer laws (with proper monitoring and enforcement) in relation
to tobacco; and (ii) to strengthen international law and resources around tobacco-related
consumer protection. A number of options for achieving these aims are available to governments.
Introduction
A number of authors argue that specific attention by gov-
ernments and advocates to the policy implementation
process is needed in tobacco control, to avoid the risk of
'policy slippage' [1-3]. Policy slippage is the gap between
the intent of policy in legislation or government direc-
tives, and the implementation of such policy. This paper
investigates the way two national laws relevant to the
activities of the tobacco industry were implemented. One
law concerns deceptive statements to potential consumers
and the public, the second, the disclosure of tobacco addi-
tives. The setting is New Zealand, which has some compo-
nents of a comprehensive tobacco control programme
[4,5].
Background
The New Zealand tobacco control programme has over
the last 15 years introduced tobacco promotion controls,
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smoking bans in nearly all indoor work and public places,
a free Quitline cessation service, and access to heavily sub-
sidised nicotine replacement treatment. There have also
been active non-government tobacco control groups since
the early 1980s [5,6]. Although per capita consumption
has declined over the last decade, until 2004 smoking
prevalence has stayed at around 25–26% [[7] p.9]. This
may be due to high uptake of smoking by youth and the
lack of fiscal incentives to support quitting (ie, there has
been only two tax rises on cigarettes beyond the rate of
inflation since 1991 [8]).
The programme operates in the context of the activity in
New Zealand of three major international tobacco compa-
nies – British American Tobacco, Philip Morris, and Impe-
rial Tobacco. The activities of such companies have been
part of the impetus for the recent formation (and ratifica-
tion by most countries) of the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control, the first treaty under the World Health
Organization's treaty making powers.
Methods
Brief case studies were used to review the implementation
of the two laws. The first case, around the Fair Trading Act
1986, involved the collection of material from: corre-
spondence with official agencies, requests to the New Zea-
land Government (using the Official Information Act
process), the opportunistic receipt of an official memo-
randum sent to a Member of Parliament, a search of the
New Zealand Commerce Commission's website for media
releases issued from 1994 to September 2002 [9], and a
search of the Factiva media website for 'New Zealand
major newspapers' for the period September 2001 –
August 2002, using the phase 'Commerce Commission'
and the word 'court'. The period covered for the case study
was from 1989 to 2004.
The second case, concerning the provision for tobacco
additives disclosure in the Smoke-free Environments Act
1990, involved website searches for both tobacco industry
and New Zealand Government correspondence. The
tobacco industry document websites tobaccodocu-
ments.org, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library, and Brit-
ish American Tobacco Documents Archive were searched
for material on the disclosure of tobacco additives in New
Zealand, using the searchwords 'zealand' 'additives'
'ingredients' 'Wellington' and 'Department/Ministry of
Health' and then by following names revealed by the
search. The period covered was from 1990 to 2004.
For both cases, material from interviews with four govern-
ment officials and ex-officials, two academics, four politi-
cians and two lawyers was used to assess the validity of the
documentary evidence, to provide leads for inquiries, and
to provide policy and political context.
Results
Context
Two aspects of the context for the case studies were: a lack
of priority for tobacco control by the dominant party in
government during 1991–1999 (the conservative
National Party) [10], and the wish by all governments
during the period covered to be seen as 'business friendly'
[[11] p.40; [12-14]]. Government officials and ex-officials
who were interviewed stated that during the 1990s they
were given very clear signals that tobacco was not a prior-
ity area for the government. These signals in turn resulted
in internal Ministry of Health decisions on the allocation
of resources.
Secondhand smoke (SHS) is estimated to cause over 300
deaths per year in New Zealand [15] making it the most
important environmental health hazard. Accurate knowl-
edge about the extent of SHS harm is important, as it
affects smoking behaviour [16,17]. In addition, the
tobacco industry has demonstrated the importance of
obscuring public knowledge of SHS harms by their invest-
ment in deception about it [18-22]. In 2000, the Minister
of Health wrote to the Hospitality Association of New
Zealand (HANZ), noting that 'It is extremely important to
treat what is said about SHS ... with due caution. ... Con-
tinuing statements by the tobacco industry, in particular,
that the science is not in on SHS ... have [been] shown to
be untrue ...' (King A. [Letter to Bruce Robertson of the Hos-
pitality Association of New Zealand from the Minister of
Health]. Wellington: 25th October 2000).
Tobacco additives are important because of their role in
tobacco product design to increase sales, and because of
their potential role in addiction [23-27]. Public knowledge
about the additives is important to help ensure informed
consumers [28-30].
Case study 1: The tobacco industry and the Fair Trading 
Act 1986
The Fair Trading Act states that:
'No person shall, in trade, engage in conduct that is liable
to mislead the public as to the nature, ... characteristics,
[or] suitability for a purpose, of goods' [[31] s.10].
The Commerce Commission has stated that its job is to
enforce 'legislation that ... prohibits misleading and
deceptive conduct by traders' [32]. The Commission has
suggested that, on the basis of court decisions, businesses
must meet a fairly high standard to comply with the Fair
Trading Act. The standard of business behaviour expected
under the Act includes protecting: 'the gullible, [those] of
less than average intelligence or poorly educated.' Gener-
ally, the question of intent is not relevant, 'rather the issue
is whether their actions did or could deceive or mislead'.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:32 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/32
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The Commission has suggested that the Act also applied
to 'conduct likely to mislead or deceive', (emphasis added)
[33].
Over the period 1989–2003, we found four episodes (in
1989, 2000, 2001 and 2002) where the Government had
an opportunity to apply this law to the statements of
tobacco companies and their allies about SHS. In 1989,
the advocacy group ASH NZ wrote to the Commerce
Commission about advertisements by the Tobacco Insti-
tute of New Zealand, which had stated that 'science has
not established that other people's cigarette smoking
causes diseases in non-smokers'. The Commission replied
that it was 'extremely difficult to accurately gauge the
effect of the Institute's advertising campaign and therefore
whether the campaign has or is likely to have been mis-
leading and deceptive.' The Commission also noted that
'the cost of any legal action would be considerable' [34].
In 2000, a new Minister of Consumer Affairs asked her
officials about the use of the Fair Trading Act for legal
action against the tobacco industry. She then reported that
such 'action may not be possible under this Act' [35]. A
request to the Ministry of Consumer Affairs under the
Official Information Act for the advice given to the Minis-
ter was declined (Manch K. [Letter from Ministry of Con-
sumer Affairs to George Thomson]. Wellington: August 23,
2001).
In July 2001, we sent information to the Commerce Com-
mission about the public statements of British American
Tobacco (BAT) New Zealand. The material included com-
ments from 1998 and 1999 by BAT officials about the
IARC (International Agency for Research on Cancer) SHS
study, that:
'The study confirms a view that the industry had long held
that while smoke in the air may annoy some non-smok-
ers, passive smoke is not a lung cancer risk' [36].
and more generally that:
'The overwhelming majority of [independent] studies
found no overall meaningful increase in risk for those
married to a smoker' [37].
These statements misrepresented the IARC findings [38].
Statements to the media in 2001 by HANZ were also given
to the Commission, on the basis that the statements could
be misleading and deceptive about the dangers of using
HANZ members' premises where there was SHS. The state-
ments included:
' A seven year study by the World Health Organisation
found no links between passive smoking and health risks'
[39] and
'... science has not established a link between passive
smoking and cancer' [40].
The statements by BAT and HANZ about SHS were for-
warded because they appeared to meet four criteria that
could help the Commission make a legal case – a pattern
of activity, clear deception, sufficiently recent date, and
large potential consequences to public health. The state-
ments appeared to deny or obscure the harm caused by
SHS, in a manner that could be described as misleading
about tobacco products sold, or the safety of services pro-
vided by HANZ members.
The Commission replied that although the material
'appears to be a breach of the Fair Trading Act, we will not
be investigating it in more depth at this stage' and that the
Commission targeted 'issues and trading practices that
have the greatest potential detriment to consumers' (Gib-
son D. [Letter to George Thomson from the Commerce Com-
mission (FTWN 49513)]. Wellington: Commerce
Commission; August 30, 2001). A spokesperson was
reported as saying that the Commission 'had decided to
refer the complaint to the Ministry of Health and would
take no further action'. This was because 'it is dealt with
better under their legislation and they have the staff with
the knowledge and expertise' [41].
In reply to the information about statements about SHS
that appeared to contravene the Fair Trading Act, the Min-
istry of Health pointed out that the:
'Public Health Directorate lacks the staff and financial
resources that would be needed to investigate the exam-
ples you presented in detail' but 'in general the Ministry
supports the interpretations you present' (ie, that BAT and
HANZ appeared to have contravened the Act's sections 9
and 13)
(Matheson D. Letter to George Thomson from the Deputy
Director General, Public Health Directorate (PP70-15-2).
Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Health; July 30,
2002).
However, because the Ministry considered that the state-
ments 'were not made in a trading context' and because of
resource reasons, the Ministry decided that 'it would not
be profitable' to pursue the matter under the Fair Trading
Act (ibid).
In May 2002, a politician from a minor party outside the
government provided information to the CommerceAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:32 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/32
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Commission about deceptive practices by the industry.
The information included two reported statements from
the media during 2001. One, by a BAT official was that 'we
have gone through the international evidence on second-
hand smoke and there is a pattern of research [indicating]
that it is not a serious health issue. Nothing is risk-free in
this world. There is a small risk to young people and
babies ...' [41]. The Director of the Commission's Fair
Trading section wrote of this statement 'reasonable mem-
bers of the public are unlikely to be misled into believing
that this statement suggests that the death of adults is not
a serious health risk, or that it denies that adults die from
second hand smoke .... The statement represents an opin-
ion and is unlikely to breach the Act' (Battell D. Memoran-
dum to Fair Trading Committee: Tobacco companies – referral
from Sue Kedgley MP. Wellington: Commerce Commis-
sion; September 11, 2002).
The second reported statement sent to the Commission
was that the science on SHS showed that 'if there was a
risk, and there may be a risk, it's not a large one'. Com-
menting on this in September 2002, the Director of the
Commission's Fair Trading section wrote that it was 'more
an expression of opinion than fact. .... The people buying
cigarettes are unlikely to be misled by comments on the
harm or otherwise of passive smoking' [42].
To put the actions and statements of the Commission into
context, we examined the legal actions it did initiate under
the Fair Trading Act during the year to August 2002. In that
time the Commission prepared or undertook at least
twenty legal actions under the Act about deceptive state-
ments. The issues were all relatively minor in terms of
health risks to consumers, and included the claim of a fish
and chip shop that it used cholesterol-free oil, eg. [43-46].
The Commission took at least eight other cases to court on
competition matters, including two Court of Appeal and
one Privy Council case [47-49]. The Commission also
decided that it was justified in investing considerable
resources in the control of the competitive aspects of the
tobacco industry, by lengthily contesting a tobacco com-
pany merger [50].
Over the period 1994–2004, the most serious breach of
the Fair Trading Act (in terms of mortality) where the
Commission has responded, was on children's cots. These
were implicated in the deaths of 22 children between
1985 and 1994 [51] (ie, around two deaths per year). In
contrast, the total national death toll from SHS in year
2000 alone was estimated at 325 [15].
In September 2005, the BAT New Zealand website contin-
ued to cast doubt on the conclusions of the IARC SHS
study, and stated:
'... we don't believe that [SHS] has been shown to cause
chronic disease, such as lung cancer, cardiovascular dis-
ease or chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, in adult
non-smokers. ....' [52].
Case study 2: The non-disclosure of tobacco additives by 
brand
In August 1990, the New Zealand Smoke-free Environments
(SFE) Act was passed by Parliament. Section 35 of the Act
required tobacco companies to submit an annual return
showing the weight of all additives used in each tobacco
product. In early October 1990 the SFE Regulations were
passed by an Order in Council, just before an election
changed the government. These regulations, amongst
other things, set out the way that Section 35 was to be car-
ried out. The regulation stipulated that companies give the
weight of every additive for every product and then the
quantity of 'each brand and each brand variant sold'. Thus,
while 'product' could be considered to be a cigarette brand
or brand variant, the regulations could also give the
impression that a 'product' was a generic type, such as cig-
arettes, cigars, or roll-your-own tobacco.
From then to the present, tobacco companies operating in
New Zealand have endeavoured to continue to both keep
the additives used in New Zealand secret from the public,
and to not disclose to government the additives for partic-
ular brands. In late 1990, a Philip Morris official in Aus-
tralia reported to the USA on some tactics he might use to
get the additives disclosure law changed, and concluded
'short of sinking N.Z. if you have any other ideas, could
you let me know' [53].
In 1991 the Government decided to insist on the disclo-
sure of additives by 'each brand and brand variants'
[54,55]. Negotiations dragged on, and by December
1992, the Department of Health (DoH) was accepting a
'temporary' compromise position where they accepted
information only for all brands, rather than for particular
brands [56]. This position was valued by the tobacco com-
panies, and Philip Morris wrote to the Tobacco Institute of
New Zealand in 1993 to emphasise that they thought the
DoH:
'under the current regulations, could impose brand-by-
brand disclosure .... The DoH could become irritated with
the industry and simply impose a brand-by-brand disclo-
sure' [57].
A 1993 note by Tony Andrade of the tobacco industry law
firm of Shook, Hardy & Bacon also stated that the:
'ingredients law in New Zealand would require complete
disclosure of individual ingredients and amounts by
brand if strictly enforced' [58].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:32 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/32
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A Rothmans (NZ) official warned a RJ Reynolds official
that for the 1994 return:
'there is a real possibility that the Department of Health
will insist on a return in the correct form, that is, identify-
ing the additives actually present rather than listing over
2000 possible additives. They may decide ... that we will
be prosecuted if we file an incorrect return again. We will
dispute this, but we would much prefer that it does not
come to this. ... We have argued with them for over three
years and their patience together with industry credibility
must be close to breaking point' [59].
The government had three options in relation to imple-
menting the SFE regulations: to compromise in some way;
to insist on information by each brand (and prosecute if
necessary); or to make clearer regulations that put the
industry's obligations beyond dispute. There was little will
by the political party in power until 1996 to confront the
tobacco industry [10] and the compromise position was
continued.
In March 1994, the New South Wales Cancer Council in
Australia released the list of additives given to the New
Zealand Government by the tobacco companies. This list
had been obtained by a request by ASH New Zealand,
under the New Zealand Official Information Act [60].
This release, along with the ongoing risk of further New
Zealand Government action on disclosures, appears to
have resulted in at least two international level meetings
of the tobacco companies involved [61,62].
After the election in late 1996, the political balance was
slightly altered. The new Associate Minister with responsi-
bility for tobacco control, Neil Kirton, was a member of
the new minority party (New Zealand First) in the ruling
coalition. After the four-year period of the compromise
which did not insist on disclosure by brand, in August
1997 the Ministry of Health wrote to the tobacco compa-
nies, requiring information on additives for each brand
[63]. However, that month Kirton was dismissed as Asso-
ciate Minister, and successive Ministers responsible for
tobacco control did not pursue the matter as a priority.
An official described the problem from the bureaucracy's
point of view:
'It's basically an issue of resourcing. ... Any regulation of
the tobacco industry is very confrontational. It requires a
lot of servicing in terms of the kind of official information
that is requested and the kind of expectations around con-
sultation.'
Finally in 2003, the new amendments to the Smoke-free
Environments Act required the testing and disclosure of
each separate brands and brand variant, 'as the regula-
tions may require'. In September 2005, these regulations
were apparently being developed but their contents were
unknown.
Discussion
Main findings and interpretation
The two cases illustrate the sub-optimal implementation
of existing laws that could have aided the control of a
product that is a major cause of premature death and
health inequalities in New Zealand. Possible reasons for
this level of implementation of legislation relevant to
tobacco companies include: the financial and opportunity
costs of implementation, the political difficulties involved
in confronting an aggressive industry, and the fragmented
nature of government. We considered that the Ministry of
Health's statement that the statements on SHS 'were not
made in a trading context' as untenable, as the context for
the sale of tobacco include the health claims made for the
products.
The two cases illustrate the importance of the costs of
implementation when governments are faced with very
large transnational companies, known to be tenacious lit-
igators willing to use every aspect of the legal process.
They also illustrate the need for substantial investment in
an aggressive comprehensive tobacco control programme,
to ensure that progress is made in spite of difficulties or
hesitancies in the enforcement of relevant laws.
When the Fair Trading Act issues arose, the relevant gov-
ernment agencies appeared to first think about their budg-
ets and staff resources. In 1989 and 2001, the costs of legal
proceedings and the staff resources needed were factors
explicitly mentioned by the Commerce Commission. In
contrast, the Commission prosecuted a number of other
(often small) businesses for minor matters, and were will-
ing to take tobacco and other large companies to court on
competition  matters. This may indicate a greater focus
within the Commission on market regulation compared
to the health of consumers.
The Ministry of Health stated explicitly that it lacked 'the
staff and financial resources that would be needed to
investigate the examples you presented in detail' (Mathe-
son D. Letter to George Thomson from the Deputy Director
General, Public Health Directorate (PP70-15-2). Wellington:
New Zealand Ministry of Health; July 30, 2002) let alone
to prosecute tobacco companies on this issue. With the
additives issue, officials knew that any attempt to enforce
the law would take scarce staff time and budgets just for
consultation and Official Information Act request
processing, even before any legal expenses.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:32 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/32
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The fear of high legal costs is justified by the experience of
governments in Canada [64], the USA [65,66], the Euro-
pean Union [67] and elsewhere, where tobacco compa-
nies use all procedural and appeal avenues in court
actions. The intended effect is partly to discourage future
litigation against them.
Internationally, government agencies generally find that
effective investment in long-term population health
issues can be squeezed out by short-term issues on politi-
cal agendas [68-70]. While the New Zealand Ministry of
Health has a large operational budget, any legal costs in
an action such as this would come from the funds of the
Public Health Directorate. This Directorate controls less
than 3% of the Ministry budget, much of which has been
devoted to politically sensitive issues in recent years
(Matheson D. Letter to George Thomson from the Deputy
Director General, Public Health Directorate. Wellington:
New Zealand Ministry of Health; 8 July, 2002). In com-
parison with resources for immunisation and cancer
screening, the use of health resources for legal expenses
was politically difficult.
The fragmented focus of government also contributed to
unwillingness to take advantage of the legislative oppor-
tunities. While the Commerce Commission was willing to
take tobacco companies to court on monopoly issues, it
considered that aspects of the Fair Trading Act with health
implications were 'dealt with better' by the Ministry of
Health [41]. The statement of the Commission staff, that
they focused on 'issues and trading practices that have the
greatest potential detriment to consumers', may indicate
that that they had not realised (or chose to ignore) the
health risks from secondhand smoke, and the negative
effects on health of continued statements that down-
played those risks.
The Ministry, while it had some focus on smokers, was less
able to focus on the tobacco industry as a major upstream
threat to public health. In New Zealand and elsewhere,
there has generally been pressure to invest the health sec-
tor budget in the treatment of disease, and action on indi-
vidual risk behaviours [71], rather than invest in 'non-
health' avenues such as legal action against tobacco com-
panies.
The cases indicate that for both deceptive statements
about SHS and for the non-disclosure of additives in New
Zealand, tobacco companies have been able to assume
that the risk of legal action by government was low. Much
of the usefulness of law is diminished if those businesses
that governments are trying to control are not convinced
that government legal action will occur or will be effective
[72-74]. The New Zealand Government failed to convince
tobacco industry investors and managers that government
would consistently use the law to seriously challenge
industry activities that affected public health in a substan-
tial way.
The investment in legal resources for tobacco control can
be contrasted with the actions of the New Zealand Gov-
ernment in another arena. During the first years of its life
from 1993, the government agency Pharmac consistently
and successfully undertook multi-million dollar legal
actions against the pharmaceutical industry. Some of the
credit for the success could be ascribed to the clear focus
of the agency in improving the efficiency of pharmaceuti-
cal purchasing on behalf of the State, and to its relatively
independent decision making structure [75,76].
However, the impetus for the structure and policies of
Pharmac was the rapidly increasing cost of pharmaceuti-
cals to the publicly funded health system. By contrast, the
net adverse consequences from the dominance by tran-
snational tobacco companies of the local market were
seen by government to generally impact on smokers,
rather than on government. The advice from Treasury
(disputed by some health advocates) has been that the tax
revenue from tobacco sales heavily outweighed the direct
costs to government from tobacco use. Therefore, govern-
ments may have been under the impression that there was
little cost incentive to take a 'Pharmac' approach to the
tobacco industry.
The situation in New Zealand on misleading statements
by the tobacco industry and its allies on SHS, despite the
explicit statute law available to address the problem, has
been in contrast to the Australian experience. There, a con-
sumer organisation (largely funded by government) in the
early 1990s took the local Tobacco Institute to court on
the issue of false information about SHS issues. The court
required that the industry could not describe SHS as not
being shown to be unsafe [77]. The comparative level of
action appears to argue for government agencies that are
sufficiently funded, and are mandated to act for consum-
ers (including smokers).
In 2005, the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission 'obtained court enforceable undertakings
from Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited' to remove mis-
leading descriptors from its products [78]. The much
greater practice in Australia compared to New Zealand, of
making the tobacco industry accountable in court for their
statements and actions, eg, [79-82], may be part of the
explanation for the much greater decline in smoking prev-
alence there [83]. This could be due to the effects of pub-
licity on smoking rates [84]. We have presented the case
elsewhere that there may also be a relationship between a
government focus on the tobacco industry, and more
effective tobacco control [85].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2005, 2:32 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/2/1/32
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The issue of additives disclosure illustrates some of the
consequences of the contrasting national and interna-
tional perspectives of governments and tobacco compa-
nies. The New Zealand Government saw the disclosure as
a relatively minor matter, not requiring a high priority. In
contrast, the companies are able and willing to focus
international resources for long periods in New Zealand
[86] and in other countries such as Australia [24], Thai-
land [87] and the Netherlands [88].
Limitations of these case studies
These case studies were not exhaustive, but rather
intended to illuminate aspects of implementation of
tobacco control policy. Interviews with other key inform-
ants, and access to further documentation could poten-
tially have provided more in-depth evidence and context.
Nevertheless, we consider it likely that the evidence gath-
ered around these case studies covers the major dimen-
sions of the issues involved.
Policy implications
To more adequately address the type of problems identi-
fied in this article, and to reduce the risk of policy slip-
page, the following options could be considered by many
governments:
1) Increasing central government capacity to work
together across national boundaries to take effective and
coordinated action in relation to tobacco companies [89].
This includes continuing the development of the Frame-
work Convention on Tobacco Control, so as to strengthen
international consumer protection law against tobacco-
related marketing and misleading claims.
2) Provision of support for an international consumer
protection law resource centre in a United Nations organ-
isation (eg, one for health related consumer protection in
the World Health Organization).
3) Ensuring explicit responsibility for the implementation
of national consumer laws by particular government
agencies, and provision of funding to ensure that the laws
are adequately monitored and enforced.
4) Explicitly acknowledging the role of the tobacco indus-
try as a factor in tobacco-related harm, and acting to min-
imise their influence.
Options 2 and 3 are likely to be particularly cost-effective,
as they can also assist in dealing with other major and
extremely costly threats to public health (eg, the control of
obesogenic foods and alcohol) [90,91]. Non-governmen-
tal organisations can advocate for all these responses, and
use the media to highlight deficiencies in existing con-
sumer protection laws.
The cases suggest immediate actions. In New Zealand,
court action is needed to clearly establish the relevance of
the Fair Trading Act to misleading statements that affect
the perceptions of at least some of the public about SHS.
The writing of the new regulations, on the disclosure of
tobacco product constituents and design, needs to allow
for considerable powers by government to address any
attempts by the tobacco industry to find loopholes in leg-
islation designed to protect the public interest.
Conclusion
Existing New Zealand laws on misleading statements
about secondhand smoke, and about the provision to
government on tobacco additives, appear to have been
insufficiently enforced. The health impact of secondhand
smoke, and the importance of information for consumers
about dangerous products suggest that such enforcement
is necessary.
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